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 On the Ideological Incompatibilities 
of Distributive Justice 
 
ALEXANDRU VOLACU1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Distributive justice is a very complex idea, having shaped much of the 
literature within analytic political philosophy in the post-Rawlsian age. But can 
we find a single all-encompassing definition for distributive justice? Knowles 
for instance defines it as “how wealth and income, goods and services should be 
distributed or allocated amongst the population of a state”2. But although the 
definition seems to give an adequate prima facie characterization of the subject 
at hand, it is too narrow as (1) it presumes that the agent benefiting from the 
distribution must necessarily be a citizen, (2) it presumes that the setting of 
distributive justice must be the state and (3) it suggests that wealth, income, 
goods and services form an exhaustive list of distributive units. All of these 
assumptions lead to an implausibly narrow view of distributive justice. 
Elizabeth Anderson has a different approach which does not suffer from these 
defficiencies and manages to capture the central debates within the distributive 
justice literature. She claims that: 
 
“Theories of distributive justice must specify two things: a metric and a 
rule. The metric characterizes the type of good subject to demands of distributive 
justice. The rule specifies how that good should be distributed”3.  
 
                                                          
1
  I would like to thank Mihaela Miroiu for valuable comments on an earlier draft of this 
paper and the journal’s anonymous reviewers for comments on the final version of the 
paper. I maintain full responsibility for any remaining shortcomings. This work was 
supported by the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 
2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund, under the project number 
POSDRU/159/1.5/S/134650 with the title “Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships for 
young researchers in the fields of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences 
and Sociology”. 
2
  Dudley Knowles, Political Philosophy, Routledge, London, 2001, p. 177. 
3  Elizabeth Anderson, “Justifying the Capabilities Approach to Justice”, in Harry 
Brighouse, Ingrid Robeyns (eds.), Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 81.  
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Although the definition takes into account the fundamental elements of 
metrics and rules, it also fails to include some important elements which differ 
between competing theories, such as the site and scope of distributive justice. If 
we are permitted a high degree of abstractization, a general structure of 
definition might be the following: justice in setting A demands that B be 
distributed to C according to some pattern D, constrained by conditions of type 
E. The general structure captures all the major operationalizations of 
distributive justice. Thus, A can be thought of as the state, the community, the 
basic structure, the family, the world etc., solving the second criticism which I 
raised against Knowles’s definition. B represents the “currency”4 of distributive 
justice and it can range from welfare/utility to primary goods, resources, 
capabilities, advantage etc. C describes the agents which are eligible for 
benefiting from the proposed pattern of distribution. The agents can be only 
rational beings, which exist at the moment when the distribution comes into 
play, or they can be non-rational but sentient beings such as children, mentally 
disabled people and animals or rational/non-rational future or past people, 
which are either definitive or possible5. D represents the pattern of distribution. 
Four patterns are usually associated with distributive justice: egalitarianism, 
prioritarianism, sufficientarianism and desert. Finally, E can represent various 
constraints imposed on the distribution, which are not themselves a structural 
component of the pattern. An example of such a condition is Dworkin’s6 criterion 
of ambition sensitiveness, which constrains the egalitarian pattern by allowing 
compensation only for inequalities which are not a matter of option luck7. 
Theories of distributive justice combine the five elements described 
above in different ways, which is why it is a Sisyphean task to ideologically 
pinpoint distributive justice in general. My claim in this paper is therefore 
simply that distributive justice is best reflected in one ideology (social-
                                                          
4
  In Cohen’s terminology (see Gerald Cohen, “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice”, 
Ethics, vol. 99, no. 4, 1989, p. 906). Sen uses the term “metric” and Frankfurt uses the 
term “parameter” to describe the same concept (see Amartya Sen, “Equality of What?”, in 
Robert Goodin, Phillip Pettit (eds.), Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, 
Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1997, p. 484 and Harry Frankfurt, “Equality and Respect”, 
Social Research, vol. 64, no.1, 1997, p. 8).  
5  Peter Vallentyne, “Distributive Justice”, in Robert Goodin, Phillip Pettit, Thomas Pogge 
(eds.), A Companion to Contemporary Philosophy (2nd edition), Blackwell Publishing, 
Malden, 2007, pp. 550-551.  
6  Ronald Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources”, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, vol. 10, no. 4, 1981, pp. 283-345.  
7  Volacu and Derviş for instance discuss two other such conditions, namely efficiency (as 
embodied by the Weak Pareto Principle) and fairness (in the sense of moral constraints on 
free-riding behavior) and show how they can be incorporated into pluralist welfare 
egalitarian theories (see Alexandru Volacu, Oana-Alexandra Derviş, “Pluralist Welfare 
Egalitarianism and the Expensive Tastes Objection”, presented at the 8th European 
Congress in Analytic Philosophy, Bucharest, 2014).  
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democracy), some of its elements disqualify it from being compatible with other 
ideologies (right-wing libertarianism, socialism, conservatism and non-
pluralistic ideologies8) and some particular interpretations of the five elements 
make them fully compatible and even required by other ideologies 
(environmentalism, feminism and cosmopolitanism). The term “compatibility” 
should be interpreted here as a property of the relation between principles, and 
more specifically between core principles of an ideology and core principles of 
distributive justice (which are operationalizations of its constitutive elements). 
When the relation is one of mutual exclusion, i.e. both principles cannot 
consistently share a common theoretical space, an ideology can be said to be 
“incompatible” with distributive justice. Compatibility between the principles 
of an ideology and the principles of distributive justice, does not however 
automatically imply that an ideology captures or promotes values related to 
distributive justice, but only that it does not reject them. A stronger relation 
between the two types of principles is one where an ideology requires certain 
distributive justice principles as part of its core. 
As a first preliminary mention, it is necessary to underline that due to 
both spatial constraints and the vastness of the literature on both distributive 
justice and political ideologies, the analysis in this paper is focused on 
summarily presenting the major topics concerning the constitutive elements of 
distributive justice, thereby trading-off the possibility of a more thorough 
examination of the implications of each element of distributive justice on 
ideologies. The upshot of this approach is the provision of a broad, albeit thin, 
overview of all major salient contemporary ideologies in relation to distributive 
justice. The downside of the approach, however, is that none of the ideologies 
are explored in-depth, leaving the results obtained here to be opened to 
challenges under a more profound analysis.  
Secondly, a methodological issue arises when seeking to map political 
theories (as is the family of distributive justice theories), which usually have a 
very abstract content, with political ideologies, which have a more practical 
nature and differ in interpretations on a case-by-case basis. This differentiation 
in interpretation refers to the fact that it is not clear where we should seek the 
expression of the ideology in question, which is both (1) representative for the 
ideology as a whole and (2) effectively action-guiding, in the sense that political 
parties actually make use of the respective ideology. My proposal here is to 
attempt the mapping of distributive justice with ideological platforms of the 
most relevant parties guided by the respective ideologies9. In principle, I will 
                                                          
8
  See Mihaela Miroiu, “Ideologii politice: o perspectivă etică”, in Idem (ed.), Ideologii 
politice actuale, Polirom, Iaşi, 2012, pp.15-34 for the distinction between pluralistic 
ideologies, borderline ideologies and monist ideologies.  
9
  This procedure is frequently used in the spatial analysis of electoral competition to map 
the ideologies of political parties, and is often considered the most reliable (see Elias 
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either use the ideologies of Europarties10 or the ideologies of the two major 
parties in the U.S.A11. While this approach has the disadvantage that it lacks a 
solid theoretical grounding of ideologies, it is preferable for the limited scope of 
the paper, since it seeks to depict an image of the actual employment of the idea 
of distributive justice in contemporary politics12.  
The paper is structured as follows: in the 2nd section I discuss the 
patterns of distributive justice and show that the pattern element is incompatible 
with right-libertarianism, conservatism, anarchism. In the 3rd section I discuss 
the currency of distributive justice and argue that any relevant treatment of the 
currency in the contemporary literature on distributive justice will eliminate 
monist ideologies and American-style conservatism. In the 4th section I discuss 
the problem of responsibility in distributive justice and argue that it is 
incompatible with the socialist ideology. In the 5th section I discuss the site of 
distributive justice and argue that under some of the most common 
interpretations the family is included, thereby making second-wave feminism 
fully compatible with distributive justice. In the 6th section I discuss the scope 
of distributive justice. This section is divided into 3 sub-sections. In the first I 
discuss the problem of intergenerational justice, claiming that some 
interpretations of right-libertarianism, conservatism and anarchism should be 
rejected by the empirically possibilist view, but that the case would be different 
for conservatism in a definitivist view. In the second sub-section I discuss the 
problem of non-rational sentient beings as belonging to the scope of justice, 
claiming that while all pluralist ideologies do hold that non-rational human 
beings are owed moral duties, some versions of libertarianism, conservatism 
and anarchism could be incompatible with the introduction of non-rational non-
human beings in the scope of justice. In the third sub-section I discuss the 
                                                                                                                                              
Dinas, Costas Gemenis, “Measuring Parties’ Ideological Positions With Manifesto 
Data: A Critical Evaluation of the Competing Methods”, Party Politics, vol. 16, no. 4, 
2010, pp. 427-450.  
10
  In the case of social democracy I will use the PES Declaration of Principles, adopted in 
2011, in the case of European conservatism I use the Prague Declaration of AECR, 
adopted in 2009, in the case of socialism I use the Manifesto of the Party of the European 
Left, adopted in 2007, in the case of environmentalism I use the Manifesto of the 
European Green Party, adopted in 2009, in the case of Christian-democracy I use the EPP 
Party Platform adopted in 2012 and in the case of European liberalism I use the 2009-
2014 ALDE Strategic Programme.  
11
  In the case of the two US parties I use the 2012 Republican Platform: 
http://www.gop.com/2012-republican-platform_home/, accessed on 02.01.2014 and the 
2012 Democratic Platform: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=101962, accessed 
on 02.01.2014.  
12  However, in those cases where an ideology cannot be traced to any significant party from 
the above mentioned category (as in the case of libertarianism, feminism and 
cosmopolitanism for instance) I will appeal directly to their core theoretical foundations. 
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problem of internationally owed duties, claiming that monist ideologies and on 
some issues conservatism is incompatible with the cosmopolitan view. In the 7th 
section I briefly describe the link between social democracy and the generic 
understanding of distributive justice, by appealing to a clear example where 
considerations of the latter type are captured by the contemporary social 
democratic ideology. In the 8th section I present the conclusions, which are 
structured according to ideologies, not elements of the general definition of 
distributive justice, as is the case in the rest of the paper.  
 
 
PATTERNS OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
 
 The pattern of a theory of distributive justice specifies how the currency 
should be distributed amongst eligible agents, in that it “specifies that a 
distribution is to vary along with some natural dimension”13.  
As previously mentioned, four main families of patterns can be 
identified: (1) egalitarianism, which maintains that justice requires that people 
be equally well off in the currency of distribution1415, (2) prioritarianism, which 
holds that justice requires that we give additional weight to benefiting people 
the worst off they are16, (3) sufficientarianism, which holds that justice requires 
that everyone reach a certain threshold in regard to the currency, beyond which 
inequalities do not require compensation17 and (4) desert-based principles, 
which are based on some interpretation of desert, usually taking into account 
historical considerations such as effort, choices, contribution etc18. 
                                                          
13
  Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1974, p. 156.  
14
  Political philosophers sympathetic to this view usually adopt a pluralist version of 
egalitarianism, claiming that while equality is the central value of justice, all things 
considered it would be better if in some cases other principles would also come into play 
(see Derek Parfit, “Equality and Priority”, Ratio (New Series), 3, 1997, p. 205). Pure 
egalitarians, who are value monists (i.e. they consider that equality is singularly relevant 
in considerations of justice) are vulnerable to various critiques, such as the levelling 
down objection (see Derek Parfit, “Another Defence of the Priority View”, Utilitas, 
vol. 24, no. 3, 2012, p. 399).  
15
  See Larry Temkin, “Iluminating Egalitarianism”, in Tom Christiano, John Christman 
(eds.), Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, 
2009, pp. 155-178 for an overview.  
16
  Derek Parfit, “Equality...cit”, pp. 202-221.  
17
  See Harry Frankfurt, “Equality as a Moral Ideal”, Ethics, vol. 98, no. 1, 1987, pp. 21-43 
and Roger Crisp, “Equality, Priority, and Compassion”, Ethics, vol. 113, no. 4, 2003, 
pp. 745-763.  
18
  See Louis Pojman, Owen McLeod, What Do We Deserve? A Reader on Justice and 
Desert, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999.  
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 Can we use the pattern element to limit the set of ideologies compatible 
with distributive justice? Let us consider Nozickian libertarianism19, which 
bases its claims of justice on moral permissibility and more specifically on the 
entitlements which people have on holdings, respecting three principles: (1) 
justice in acquisition, (2) justice in transfer and (3) rectification of injustice in 
holdings20. First of all, Nozick challenges the neutrality of the term distributive 
justice, arguing that: 
 
“hearing the term ‘distribution’, most people presume that some thing or mechanism 
uses some principle or criterion to give out a supply of things. [...] However, we are 
not in the position of children who have been given portions of pie by someone who 
now makes last minute adjustments to rectify carelss cutting. There is no central 
distribution, no person or group entitled to control all the resources, jointly deciding 
how they are to be doled out”21. 
 
Thus, for Nozick the term distributive justice has a bias embedded 
within its structure which, in his view, mistakenly assumes that there is indeed 
something to be distributed on moral grounds. His claim is that if we are in a 
state of the world B which comes into existence from a state of the world A 
which was just via a historical process where all property was acquired and 
transferred justly, the set of distributive units is void and thus there would be 
nothing to distribute.  
 Further, Nozick clearly delineates his own theory of justice as 
entitlement from a patterned principle, which he claims that “almost every 
suggested principle of distributive justice is”22. The main thrust of Nozick’s 
argument against patterned principles is based on the fact that “no distributional 
patterned principle of justice can be continuously realized without continuous 
interference with people’s lives”23. Let us consider his famous Wilt 
Chamberlain example. In order to neutralize the inequalities which would be 
generated after a certain amount of time by Chamberlain’s arrangement, the 
state must do one of two things: (1) forcibly block the transfer of money from 
                                                          
19
  I use Nozickian libertarianism here since it directly targets the issue of distributional 
patterns. Nevertheless, for this particular issue, other libertarian versions such as that of 
Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, Routledge, Abington, 1944 or Murray Rothbard, 
For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburn, 
1973 share the same outlook. In fact, Rothbard actually criticizes Nozick for adhering to 
the idea of a minimal state as being too extensive, claiming that his sequences of 
evolution from the dominant protective agency to the ultraminimal state and from the 
ultraminimal state to the minimal state are morally impermissible since they violate 
people’s rights (Murray Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty, New York University Press, 
New York, 1998, pp. 237-245).  
20
  Robert Nozick, Anarchy...cit, pp. 150-153.  
21
  Ibidem, p. 149.  
22  Ibidem, p. 156. 
23
  Ibidem, p. 163. 
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spectators to Chamberlain, which would be morally impermissible since it was 
consensual or (2) forcibly take Chamberlain’s money once they are in his 
possession, although they were voluntarily given to him by the spectators, 
through taxation. Nozick rules out taxation as morally impermissible, 
considering that “taxation of earnings from labor is on a par with forced 
labor”24. In other words, through taxation the state institutes a right of partial 
ownership
 in the individual, which goes fundamentally against one of the two major 
principles of any libertarian theory, i.e. self-ownership25.  
 Thus, regardless of the actual interpretation of the pattern, libertarians 
would see it as morally impermissible since it violates the right of self-
ownership26. The pattern element is incompatible with the libertarian ideology 
and, a fortiori, it is also incompatible with anarchism, in both the individualist 
and collectivist versions, since the common thread which runs through both of 
them is that “anarchism is the approach which considers that all forms of human 
association must be voluntary”27, a formulation which rejects distributive 
patterns if they are not actually chosen by individuals. Since the same 
minimalist view of state interventionism is present in both the American strand 
of conservatism, associated with the Republican Party, who state the following: 
“we oppose interventionist policies that [...] allow it [the federal government] to 
pick winners and losers in the marketplace”28 and the biggest conservative 
Europarty, i.e. the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists 
(spearheaded by the Conservative Party of the U.K.), who state as the first 
principle of their Prague Declaration: “Free enterprise, free and fair trade and 
competition, minimal regulation, lower taxation, and small government as the 
ultimate catalysts for individual freedom and personal and national 
                                                          
24
  Ibidem, p. 169. 
25
  Ibidem, p.172. The other one being the “moral power to acquire property rights in natural 
resources and other unowned resources” (Peter Vallentyne, “Left-Libertarianism”, in 
David Estlund (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2012, p. 152).  
26  However, left-libertarians claim that the principle of justice in acquisition needs to have a 
much stronger interpretation than that given by Nozick to the lockean proviso, i.e. that no 
individual be made worse-off after the appropriation, and that the appropriation should 
leave for the rest an equal share per capita or an equal opportunity for well-being with the 
individual who has performed the appropriation. This would seem to require some 
compensation which could be constructed as a distributive pattern, but it might be argued, 
as Risse does (see Mathias Risse, “Does Left-Libertarianism Have Coherent 
Foundations?”, Politics, Philosophy and Economics, vol. 3, no. 3, 2004, pp. 337-364), 
that in that case (full) self-ownership is inconsistent with the left-libertarian principle of 
justice in acquisition. See Peter Vallentyne, Hillel Steiner, Michael Otsuka, “Why Left-
Libertarianism Is Not Incoherent, Indeterminate, or Irrelevant: A Reply to Fried”, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 33, no. 2, 2005, pp. 201-215 for a reply.  
27
  See Valentin Quintus Nicolescu, “Anarhismul”, in Mihaela Miroiu (ed.), Ideologii 
politice...cit., pp. 301-323.  
28
  http://www.gop.com/our-party/, accessed on 30.12.2013.  
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prosperity”29, it could be claimed that conservatism is also incompatible with 
distributive justice, since it broadly rejects patterned principles of distribution.  
 
 
THE CURRENCY OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
 
 The other major issue surrounding theories of distributive justice is the 
currency of the distribution. The currency debate is usually framed in the 
context of egalitarian justice, so in the following lines I will also adhere to this 
framework, even though the currency is also relevant to prioritarian and 
sufficientarian theories. Five currencies are most commonly discussed in the 
literature30: (1) welfare31, (2) primary goods32, (3) resources33, (4) advantage34 
and (5) capabilities35.  
 But in spite of the different interpretations of the equalisandum, all 
these egalitarian theories as well as the other patterned conceptions of justice 
described in the previous section adhere to a common core of moral and 
political equality (without which the various currencies would be inconsistent) 
based on non-discrimination (formal and informal) on the basis of contingent 
inequalities such as race, gender, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, social and 
economic status etc. Arneson eloquently makes the case in the following lines: 
  
“Being a member of the human species entitles one to a fundamental equal 
moral status and dignity, the same for all humans. Ideologies and creeds that deny the 
fundamental equality of humanity are guilty of prejudice and bigotry. They are 
beyond the moral pale. For example, sexist views that claim men to be superior to 
women, racist views that hold that some human groups defined by skin color or 
lineage are superior to others, and aristocratic doctrines that divide humanity into 
those naturally fit by quality of birth for membership in a privileged caste or class 
and those fit for the lower rungs of fixed hierarchies, do not merit serious 
consideration by reflective minds”36. 
                                                          
29
  http://www.aecr.eu/about-us, accessed on 30.12.2013.  
30
  For an overview see Alex Callinicos, “Equality of What?”, in Colin Farelly (ed.), 
Contemporary Political Theory: A Reader, Sage Publications, London, 2004, pp. 36-44.  
31
  Richard Arneson, “Welfare Should be the Currency of Justice”, Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy, vol. 30, no. 4, 2000, pp. 497-524.  
32
  John Rawls, “Social Unity and Primary Goods” in A. Sen, B. Williams, Utlitarianism and 
Beyond, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982. 
33
  Ronald Dworkin, “What is Equality?...cit”.  
34
  Gerald Cohen, “On the Currency...cit”.  
35
  Amartya Sen, “Equality of What?...cit” and Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human 
Development: The Capabilities Approach, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000. 
See Ingrid Robeyns, “The Capability Approach: A Theoretical Survey”, Journal of 
Human Development, vol. 6, no. 1, 2005, pp. 103-105) for an outline of the differences 
between Sen and Nussbaum’s approaches.  
36  Richard Arneson, “Equality”, in Robert Simon (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Social and 
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The claim that all people should be morally and politically equal on the 
basis of belonging to the human species, regardless of religion, class and race 
eliminates the possibility that monist ideologies37, such as fascism, national-
socialism or religious fundamentalism could encapsulate distributive justice. 
Although these ideologies can be compatible with some patterned principles 
(even though they are not actually compatible with the patterned discussed in 
section 3), the deontic constraints of moral and political equality which are 
pervasive in theories of distributive justice seems to disqualify them from the 
range of ideologies which can accommodate distributive justice. Further, it 
could also be argued that the stance of American conservatism on social issues 
such as same-sex marriage, abortion, immigration or the place of religion in 
state affairs is also opposed to the ideal of moral and political equality, favoring 
the imposition of certain values on minorities or vulnerable groups.  
 
 
THE PLACE OF RESPONSIBILITY  
IN DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
 
 Another significant debate which usually also takes place in the context 
of egalitarianism38 regards the question of whether responsibility should play 
some constraining role in distributive justice theories or not. More specifically, 
should it come into play by removing the duties of compensation for morally 
arbitrary inequalities? The prevalent position is that this is in fact the case. The 
paradigmatic case for this position is that of Dworkin, who distinguishes 
between two types of inequalities in outcomes. Those that come about as a 
result of option luck, which is interpreted as “a matter of how deliberate and 
                                                                                                                                              
Political Philosophy, Blackwell Publishers, Malden, 2002, pp. 85-105.  
37
  When referring to monist ideologies in this paper I specifically exclude communism for 
the following reason: while the communist ideology, in its marxist interpretation, does 
meet the Andersonian conditions required by a theory of distributive justice (see supra, 
section 1), in that it specifies a pattern of distribution and a distributive currency (i.e. 
needs), it is not clear if it actually specifies a theory of justice to begin with. Husami (see 
Ziyad Husami, “Marx on Distributive Justice”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 8, 1, 
1978, pp. 27-64) for instance claims that Marx does indeed offer a moral evaluation of 
capitalism, but even if this is true, the fact that the communist society is characterized by 
an abundance of resources and considerations of justice come into play only when there is 
a conflict regarding the distribution of resources lead to the idea that communism does not 
appeal to justice (distributive or otherwise), but instead transcends the concept of justice 
(see Jonathan Wolff, “Karl Marx”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 
2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/ 
entries/marx/, 2010). 
38
  Since it is the dominant pattern prevalent at the moment in distributive justice thinking.  
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calculated gambles turn out ‒ whether someone gains or loses through 
accepting an isolated risk he or she should have anticipated and might have 
declined“39 and those that come about as a result of brute luck, interpreted as “a 
matter of how risks fall out that are not in that sense deliberate gambles“40. For 
instance, if you lose your house at a poker game that is the result of bad option 
luck, but if an earthquake levels it down it can be said that you have had bad 
brute luck in that respect. Dworkin then goes on to claim that only inequalities 
resulting from bad brute luck are subjected to compensation. The inequalities 
resulting from bad option luck are not subjected to compensation because they 
are based on people’s preference for a risky way of life and to ignore this 
preference is to treat people differently when composing the bundles of 
resources which are to be distributed41. There are authors, however, who 
challenge the view that responsibility can be deployed through the option luck – 
brute luck distinction, such as Lippert-Rasmussen42, Vallentyne43, Barry44 or 
Knight45. However, since at the moment mainstream egalitarian theories seem 
to agree on giving a significant role to individual responsibility in the 
establishment of distributive principles, I will consider it plausible in this paper.  
What sort of ideologies would be affected in their relation to 
distributive justice by this fact? First of all, monist ideologies are once again 
disqualified as incompatible since they do not allow individual choice to 
                                                          
39
  Ronald Dworkin, “What is Equality?...cit”, p. 293.  
40  Ibidem.  
41
  Ibidem, pp. 294-296. Cohen (see Gerald Cohen, “On the Currency...cit”) and Arneson 
(see Richard Arneson, “Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare”, Philosophical 
Studies, vol. 56, no. 1, 1989, pp. 77-93) further develop this view in a different direction 
than Dworkin, insisting on the full neutralization of brute bad luck (unlike Dworkin who 
only seeks to partially mitigate it via a hypothetical insurance market). It is essential to 
note however, that both Cohen and Arneson, whose theories of egalitarian justice 
constitute the present “mainstream” of luck egalitarianism (Carl Knight, “Distributive 
Luck”, South African Journal of Philosophy, vol. 31, no. 3, 2012, p. 547), are what 
Holtug and Lippert-Rasmussen (see Nils Holtug and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, “An 
Introduction to Contemporary Egalitarianism”, in Idem (eds.), Egalitarianism: New 
Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, 
p. 20) call “responsibility-agnostic egalitarians”. This means that they agree that the 
proper concern of egalitarian justice is to mitigate inequalities resulting from bad brute 
luck, however, they do not take a specific metaphysical position on the problem of free 
will and maintain the view that if hard determinism is true, luck egalitarianism will 
always collapse into outcome egalitarianism. 
42
  Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, “Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility”, Ethics, 
vol. 111, no. 3, 2001, pp. 548-579.  
43
  Peter Vallentyne, “Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities’, 
Ethics, vol. 112, no. 3, 2002, pp. 529-557.  
44  Nicholas Barry, “Reassessing Luck Egalitarianism”, Journal of Politics, vol. 70, no. 1, 
2008, pp. 136-150.  
45
  Carl Knight, “Distributive Luck...cit”, p. 547.  
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constrain the distributive patterns, however unequal they should be. For 
instance, the distributive pattern under the national-socialist regime with respect 
to political rights was that some people should have them based on their 
ethnicity and some people should not based on the same criterion. Individual 
responsibility played no part in constraining the distributive pattern and no 
claims based on it could be raised and satisfied under the respective ideology. 
But aside from these, it might also be the case that socialism too falls under the 
incompatible categories of ideologies, because of the role played by 
responsibility. It is a very difficult task to pinpoint exactly what contemporary 
socialism is, seen as how it appears to be a mixture of mainly social-democratic 
and communist values (with other influences such as environmentalism and 
feminism playing their part as well), accentuating on the latter46. The political 
expression of socialism at a European level, however, seems to be the European 
Party of the Left, which is an alliance of “socialist, communist, red-green and 
other democratic left parties”47. The Party Manifesto48 itself, shows a somewhat 
blurry vision of what socialism is and how it differentiates itself from other 
policy platforms. However, a distinctly Marxist approach to societal structure 
appears to emerge. The most relevant aspect for the purpose of this present 
section is the couching of policies as being driven by (and affecting) social 
classes, not individuals. This view permeates the Manifesto, nowhere so clear 
however as in the following phrase: “In the EU various interests are in conflict 
with each other. For us this creates a new political space for class struggle and 
for the defence of the interests of workers”49. By framing their ideological 
conceptions on the idea of social classes rather than individuals, it could be 
argued that contemporary socialists fall back on the same type of political 
holism as the basic Marxist theory, which some claim is the “best-known 
theory” which embodies holism50.  
It could therefore be claimed that, by basing their normative 
conceptions on social wholes instead of individuals, socialists do not intend to 
take responsibility, which is connected at the most primitive level to the 
preferences of individuals, into account in their ideological proposals.  
 
 
                                                          
46
  For a historical distinction between socialism and communism see Valentin Quintus 
Nicolescu, “Comunismul”, in Mihaela Miroiu (ed.), Ideologii politice…cit., p. 359.  
47  http://www.european-left.org/propos-de-la-ge/documents, accessed on 31.12.2013.  
48  http://archiv2007.sozialisten.de/politik/publikationen/newsletter/view_html?zid=24811 
&bs=1&n=13, accessed on 31.12.2013.  
49
  http://archiv2007.sozialisten.de/politik/publikationen/newsletter/view_html?zid=24811 
&bs=1&n=13, accessed on 31.12.2013. 
50
 Brian Barry, “Does Society Exist? The Case for Socialism”, in Preston King (ed.), 
Socialism and the Common Good: New Fabian Essays, Frank Cass & Co., London, 1996, 
p. 118.  
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THE SITE OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
 
 The site of distributive justice “refers to the kinds of objects 
(individuals’ actions, individuals’ character, rules, or institutions, and so on) 
appropriately governed by principles of justice, that is, to which the principles 
of justice rightly apply”51. The on-going debate on the site of distributive justice 
is much more far-reaching, but one debate carries especially profound 
ideological implications, i.e. is the family included in the list of institutions 
which form the site of distributive justice? The site of distributive justice is, in 
the Rawlsian account, the basic structure of society. According to Rawls, the 
basic structure is “the way in which the major social institutions distribute 
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from 
social cooperation”52. Amongst the major social institutions which composes 
the basic structure Rawls directly mentions: the political constitution, the main 
social and economic arrangements, “the legal protection of freedom of thought 
and liberty of conscience, competitive markets, private property in the means of 
production” and the monogamous family53. Rawls reiterates this position later 
on, claiming that once again that “the nature of the family”54 belongs to the 
basic structure and that “the family is part of the basic structure, since one of its 
main roles is to be the basis of the orderly production and  reproduction of 
society and its culture from one generation to the next”55. However, in spite of 
his very clear, nominal inclusion of the family in the basic structure, Rawls is 
confronted by two main lines of criticism: (1) Okin’s56  critique that in effect he 
still treats family as a moral, not political domain, and consequently does not 
apply the principles of justice to the family and (2) Cohen’s57 critique that he 
cannot consistently include the family in the basic structure.  
 The problem which Okin brings to the forefront is that even though 
Rawls acknowledges that the family is an institution which falls within the 
domain of the basic structure, seen as how the basic structure “is the primary 
subject of justice because its effects are so profound and present from the start” 
and the effects of the family conform to this requirement, he claims a special 
sort of status for the family, on par with associations and religious institutions, 
                                                          
51  Arash Abizadeh, “Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and Coercion: On the Scope (not Site) 
of Distributive Justice”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 35, no. 4, 2007, p. 323.  
52
  John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971, p. 6.  
53  Ibidem.  
54
  John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, NewYork, 1993, p. 258.  
55  Idem, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 64, 
no. 3, 1997, p. 787.  
56
  Susan Moller Okin, “Political Liberalism, Justice, and Gender”, Ethics, vol. 105, no. 1, 
1994, pp. 23-43.  
57
  Gerald Cohen, “Where the Action is: On the Site of Distributive Justice”, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, vol. 26, no. 1, 1997, pp. 3-30.  
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as non-political forms of organization58. But since they are non-political, the 
principles of justice do not directly apply to them, as Rawls himself argues: 
“The principles of political justice are to apply directly to this structure, but are 
not to apply directly to the internal life of the many associations within it, the 
family among them”59. But for Okin this is an obvious problem, as  
 
“by separating out the sphere of the political, to which justice is to apply, from the 
personal, associational, and familial, within which there is to be great tolerance for 
many different beliefs and modes of life, he seems to close off the possibility of 
ensuring that families (and associations) are just”60. 
 
In any case, there seems to be a clear ambiguity in Rawls’s thought, 
since on the one hand he includes the family in the basic structure, but on the 
other hand he claims that it is not political so it should not be directly regulated 
by the principles of justice. His own attempt to solve this ambiguity is to claim 
that although the internal structure of the family, just like any other associations 
which significantly influence the lives of individuals, is not directly regulated 
by his principles of justice, there are constraints generated by political 
institutions which bear down on the members of families, qua citizens, and 
ensure an environment of equality from the standpoint of rights, liberties and 
opportunities61. Okin focuses her attention especially on Rawls’s equal 
treatment of families and other associations (universities, churches etc.), 
claiming that unlike in the latter case, entrance and exit into the family is often 
not voluntary (at birth and in the case of unwanted divorce) and this is why 
external constraints are insufficiently adept at bringing justice to the family, 
which is “perhaps [...] the quintessential place for justice”62.  
 Okin’s position is therefore that Rawls should unambiguously include 
the family in the basic structure of society and that it should be regulated 
directly by the principles of justice. Cohen supports Okin’s view about the 
direct application of justice principles to the family but disagrees with her that 
the family could be a part of the basic structure. Cohen argues that Rawls stands 
in the middle of a dilemma by making different claims about what exactly is the 
nature of the basic structure. Abizadeh identifies three strands of interpretations 
proposed by Rawls himself, which he subsequently terms theories of the basic 
                                                          
58
  Susan Moller Okin, “Political Liberalism...cit”, p. 27.  
59  John Rawls, “The Idea...cit”, p. 788. 
60
  Susan Moller Okin, “Political Liberalism...cit”, pp. 38-39. Furthermore, the direct 
regulation of the family through the principles of justice is in Okin’s view demanded by 
the fact that it plays “an important first role in the formation of citizens' sense of justice” 
(Ibidem, p. 32), a statement explicitly endorsed by Rawls himself.  
61
  John Rawls, “The Idea...cit”, pp. 789-790. 
62  Susan Moller Okin, “Gender, Justice and Gender: An Unfinished Debate”, Fordham Law 
Review, vol. 72, no. 5, 2004, pp. 1564-1566.  
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structure: (1) cooperation theory, in which the basic structure is composed of 
“the institutions that determine and regulate the fundamental terms of social 
cooperation”, (2) pervasive impact theory, in which the basic structure consists 
of “the institutions that have profound and pervasive impact upon persons’ life 
chances” and (3) coercive theory, in which the basic structure is composed only 
by “the institutions that subject persons to coercion”63. Cohen recognizes this 
ambiguity, but claims that the only consistent theory of the basic structure is the 
coercive one, a case in which family cannot belong to the basic structure. The 
reason is very simple: if we are to allow non-coercive social institutions to 
belong to the basic structure, we cannot consistently draw the line between their 
regulation and the regulation of individual choices through principles of justice, 
since “behavior is constitutive of non-coercive structures”64. So in order for 
Rawls to include the family in the basic structure, he must open the door to 
individual choices as well, but if choices are regulated by the principles of 
justice there is no need for a basic structure as an instrumental tool for applying 
distributive justice, which will now be applied via a normative ethos in the 
society. But on the other hand, Rawls cannot consistently exclude family from 
the site of distributive justice, since it clearly has a profound and pervasive 
impact on individuals65.  
 Although the discussion on this matter is far from being concluded, the 
most commonly held views seem to be either that, following Okin, the family 
should be a site of distributive justice, qua basic structure institution, or, 
following Cohen, that the family should be a site of distributive justice, on the 
basis of an existing social ethos. Since, as Rawls recognizes, “some believe that 
the family itself is the linchpin of gender injustice”66, including the family as a 
site of distributive justice seems to point towards a close affiliation of 
distributive justice with feminist ideology in general, and in particular with the 
ideas associated with the second wave of feminism67. But even if we do not take 
into account the relation between family and distributive justice, by virtue of 
considering gender as a morally arbitrary natural contingency generated and by 
                                                          
63
  Arash Abizadeh, “Cooperation, Pervasive Impact...cit”, p. 319.  
64
  Gerald Cohen, “Where the Action is...cit”, p. 20.  
65
  Ibidem, pp. 17-24. Cohen argues that: “Family structure is fateful for the benefits and 
burdens that redound to different people, and, in particular, to people of different sexes, 
where ‘family structure’ includes the socially constructed expectations which lie on 
husband and wife. And such expectations are sexist and unjust if, for example, they direct 
the woman in a family where both spouses work outside the home to carry a greater 
burden of domestic tasks. Yet such expectations need not be supported by the law for 
them to possess informal coercive force: sexist family structure is consistent with sex-
neutral family law” (Ibidem, p. 22).  
66
  John Rawls, “The Idea...cit”, pp. 791-792.  
67
  Mihaela Miroiu, Drumul către autonomie: Teorii politice feministe, Polirom, Iaşi, 2004, 
pp. 68-73.  
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striving to provide equal rights, liberties and fair equality of opportunity 
regardless of gender divisions, distributive justice already shows a strong 
compatibility with the feminist ideology. The extension of the site of 
distributive justice to the family as well significantly strengthens this 
compatibility, but is not uniquely constitutive for it.  
 
 
THE SCOPE OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
 
 The scope of distributive justice “refers to the range of persons who 
have claims upon and responsibilities to each other arising from considerations 
of justice”68. A specification of the scope of distributive justice will answer the 
questions of “what kinds of beings have ‘justicial standing’?” or “to whom is 
justice owed?”69. There are three distinct issues regarding the scope of justice 
which have major ideological implications. I will discuss each of these three 
problems in three separate sub-section, naming them following Vallentyne’s70 
distinction of the most radical views on each dimension. 
 
 
The Presentism/Empirical Possibilism Dimension 
 
  The presentism/empirical dimension refers to a larger class of issues 
which fall under the domain of intergenerational justice71. The question 
                                                          
68
  Arash Abizadeh, “Cooperation, Pervasive Impact...cit”, p. 323.  
69
  Peter Vallentyne, “Distributive...cit”, p. 550.  
70
  Ibidem, pp. 550-551.  
71
  Another dimension of intergenerational justice is that of the whole lives view/beings-at-a-
time view. This dimension questions what exactly is “the proper unit of [...] concern” 
(Larry Temkin, Inequality, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, p. 232) for distributive 
justice. The whole lives view states that distributive justice should focus on the whole 
lives of individuals, as opposed to the beings-at-a-time view, which following McKerlie 
(see Dennis McKerlie, “Equality and Time”, Ethics, 99, 1989, pp. 475-491) can be further 
split into the simultaneous segments view and the corresponding segments view. The 
whole lives view is most often adopted by political philosophers, but it is called into 
question by Temkin (see Larry Temkin, Inequality, cit, pp. 235-238) who shows that it 
can lead to extremely counter-intuitive results. It is also vulnerable to the critique levied 
by Kekes (see John Kekes, “A Question for Egalitarians”, Ethics, vol. 107, no. 4, 2004, 
pp. 658-669) that distributive justice on the whole lives view should prioritize health care 
for men since on average they have a shorter expected life span than women. Although 
the discussions on this issue are very interesting and remain largely unexplored, I do not 
think that either view would ab initio would have significant ideological consequences, 
since no ideology seems to strictly adhere to any of the above mentioned views. One 
important application of the distinction concerns restorative justice and it would seem 
apparent that a form of radical anarchism with unenforceable self-ownership rights might 
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addressed here is: do we have a duty of justice to both existing and non-existing 
individuals or only to the existing ones? At one end of the spectrum we have the 
presentist view, which states that we have duties of justice only to those who 
exist at the present time and at the other we have the empirical possibilism 
view, which states that we have duties of justice to possible future (or past) 
individuals. Between them lies a somewhat less radical view, termed definitism, 
which holds that we have duties of justice to future individuals if “given the 
laws of nature and the circumstances”, they will definitely exist (or have 
definitely existed)72. 
 On the presentist view, I gather that (at the very least) all pluralist 
ideologies would concur that duties of justice (not necessarily distributive 
justice) extend to some (if not even all) of the people existing in the present. If 
this statement is false, than the respective ideology does not have any theory of 
justice built into its ideological core. The more interesting question is what sort 
of ideologies are affiliated with the empirical possibilist73 and definitist views. 
Let us begin with the former. Duties to mere possible future individuals can be 
ideologically sought out most easily in party platforms by seeking the 
sustainable use of resources, sustainable growth and references to the well-
being of future generations. Following the same pattern of appealing to the 
documents stating fundamental principles of Europarties, I find that it is 
compatible with environmentalism (in the 2009 Manifesto of the European 
Green Party74), with social democracy (in the Declaration of principles75), with 
American liberalism76, with Christian-democracy (in the 2012 EPP Party 
Platform77), with European liberalism (in the 2009-2014 ALDE Strategic 
Programme78) and socialism (in the Manifesto of the Party of the European 
Left79). The divide actually seems to closely resemble that in section 2, where I 
                                                                                                                                              
not call for restorative justice, demanded by the whole lives view, but aside from that, no 
other ideologies would seem problematic from this standpoint. For instance, any sort of 
reasonably constructed libertarianism would either prevent (via natural law) or rectify the 
injustices occuring in the first phase.  
72  Ibidem, p. 550 
73
  Especially since empirical possibilist views suffer from what is called the non-identity 
problem (see Derek Parfit, “Future Generations: Further Problems”, Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, vol. 11, no. 2, 1982, pp. 113-172).  
74  http://europeangreens.eu/sites/europeangreens.eu/files/2009%20Manifesto.pdf, accessed 
on 02.01.2014.  
75
  http://www.pes.eu/sites/www.pes.org/files/declaration_of_principles_web_en_0.pdf,ac 
cessed on 02.01.2014. 
76  http://www.democrats.org/issues/environment, accessed on 02.01.2014. 
77
  http://www.epp.eu/sites/default/files/content/EN%20with%20cover.pdf, accessed on 
02.01.2014. 
78
  http://www.alde.eu/fileadmin/docs/home/documents/FINAL%20STRATEGIC%20PRO 
GRAMME_web.pdf, accessed on 02.01.2014. 
79
  http://archiv2007.sozialisten.de/politik/publikationen/newsletter/view_html?zid=24811& 
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discussed the patterning element of a theory of distributive justice. While 
libertarianism, conservatism and anarchism do not necessarily (for consistency 
purposes) reject the view that justice is owed to future possible individuals, they 
do not usually associate themselves with it either. At least two counter-
examples however can be given, both regarding libertarianism. On the one 
hand, some libertarians can be free-market environmentalists, who claim that 
the preservation of resources can be best provided by following a libertarian 
political system. Since property rights are well-defined in a libertarian system, 
privatization of all resources might be required, they argue, for escaping 
common-pool resources dilemmas80 and preserving resources for future 
generations. Steiner and Vallentyne81 however, argue that no right-libertarian 
theory and no joint-ownership libertarian theory would plausibly capture 
considerations of intergenerational justice and that only a left-libertarian theory, 
which constrains both the appropriation and use of resources will take such 
considerations into account.  
 The definist view might bring another interesting consideration into the 
picture. First of all, ideologies which defend the empirical possibilist view will, 
a fortiori, also defend the definist view. But while libertarian and anarchist 
theories do not seem to bring anything new to the table, conservatism, with its 
stance on abortion seems to claim that we have duties of justice to people who 
have not yet entered into existence, but will do so with certainty (or at least to a 
very large degree). Granted, the interpretation of justice may not be consistent 
with distributive justice from a specific standpoint (it may violate the equal 
distribution of rights to men and women or might violate the choice condition), 
but considerations of justice do come into play for conservatives when moving 
from the mere possible future individuals to definitive individuals.  
 
 
The Rational Agents/Sentient Beings Dimension 
 
 This dimension refers to the mental attributes required for agents to be 
considered to fall within the scope of distributive justice. As Vallentyne 
contends, “as a substantive matter, it is relatively uncontroversial that 
contemporary, productive, rational agents of one’s society have some kind of 
                                                                                                                                              
bs=1&n=13, accessed on 02.01.2014. 
80
  See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 12-13.  
81
  Hillel Steiner, Peter Vallentyne, “Libertarian Theories of Intergenerational Justice”, in 
Axel Gosseries, Lukas Meyer (eds.), Justice Between Generations, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2009, pp. 50-76.  
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rights against one”82. The question raised is whether we also have duties which 
extend beyond rational agents, i.e. to children, mentally disabled individuals 
and sentient non-human beings such as animals. For the first two categories, the 
problem is relatively uncontroversial, since most ideologies do not appeal to 
autonomy in their considerations of justice but to the intrinsically valuable 
status of existing as a human being. Although the exact specification of the 
rights which children and the mentally disabled individuals have ranges 
between ideologies ‒ for instance, since it is egalitarian derived, social 
democracy would plausibly argue in favor of subsidizing at least access to 
primary education for all children, while libertarians would normally not adopt 
the same position83 ‒, at least some general duty is owed to each of them in 
every ideology, even if it is only a very limited right to life and subsistence. The 
question of sentient non-human beings may be somewhat more difficult to 
tackle however and, from the standpoint of its ideological effects, seems to be 
very close to the distinction in the previous section. Most ideologies would 
accept the idea that there are some moral duties owed to animals, even though, 
aside from the environmentalist ideology (mainly deep ecology), perhaps not as 
strong as to non-autonomous human beings and not as strong as those claimed 
by Singer84 or Regan85. The duty to minimize their pain when killed or the 
duties concerning prohibition of hunting endangered species would fall in a 
category of policies compatible with most ideologies. It might be the case 
however that libertarianism, since it is based on the autonomy of beings, would 
not impose any duties owed to animals. Vallentyne does not agree with this 
view and suggests an alternative, i.e. the possibility to consider animals as being 
full self-owners, with the rights involved being understood as protecting their 
interests rather than their choices86. However, he recognizes the absurdity of 
this possibility and rejects it, since animals such as rats would then be protected 
by rights of self-ownership on par with humans. Free-market environmentalists 
however will claim that in many cases, just as preservation of resources can be 
more adequately achieved by privatization, so would preservation of species. 
Schmidtz87 for instance, offers precisely this sort of argument when defending 
                                                          
82  Peter Vallentyne, “Distributive...cit”, p. 550. I will assume that only non-monist 
ideologies are relevant here. It might be the case that under national-socialism for instance 
Vallentyne’s statement is false.  
83
  This is not to be understood as though libertarians would claim that there are no duties 
addressed to children, which is a false position (see Morris Lipson, Peter Vallentyne, 
“Libertarianism, Autonomy, and Children”, Public Affairs Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 4, 1991, 
pp. 333-352).  
84  Peter Singer, Animal Liberation, Harper Collins Publishers, New York, 1975.  
85  Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1983.  
86
  Peter Vallentyne, “Libertarianism...cit”.  
87  David Schmidtz, Persons, Polis, Planet: Essays in Applied Philosophy, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 228-238.  
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libertarian preservation policies of elephants in Botswana and Zimbabwe. There 
are, therefore, some consequentialist interpretations of libertarianism which are 
compatible with the extended view of the scope of distributive justice, but, no 
fully fledged libertarian deontological theory defending the rights of animals 
exists88. 
 
 
The Statism/Cosmopolitanism Dimension 
 
 This dimension refers to the range of agents89 to which justice applies, 
from the point of view of the existence of an underlying requirement of sharing 
some common political background between agents. The question raised here 
is: do we have moral duties to agents with whom we do not share a common 
political framework? In turn, this question is further developed into: is justice 
national or international in scope?  
 Most of the literature on global distributive justice is heavily influenced 
by Rawlsian theory and both answers to the question often claim to be derived 
from the ideas of Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. Pogge90 is one of the 
main proponents of the position that justice is global in scope, building this 
view on the fact that: (1) the international system is characterized by a high-
level of political and economic interdependency (which is a pre-requisite for the 
application of justice as fairness) and (2) there are severe inequalities at a global 
level which need rectification, such as the fact that (2.1) citizens of different 
nations have unequal chances to influence the transnational political decisions, 
(2.2) equally talented and motivated individuals do not possess equal chances to 
obtain public goods, services and positions, regardless of their nation of origin 
and (2.3) social and economic inequalities are not used in the benefit of the 
world’s worst off positions91. These concerns are all shared by Rawls in his 
theory of justice as fairness, but only within the society itself. Pogge’s solution 
to the problems raised is to propose a “global resource dividend”, that could be 
interpreted as a type of difference principle and may be successfully defended 
by an egalitarian conception of international justice. The dividend demands that 
people should pay a proportional tax on the resources they extract from the 
territory within its national borders, whether they use it themselves or export 
it92.  
                                                          
88
  Peter Vallentyne, “Libertarianism...cit”. 
89
  For simplicity I will assume that they are rational human beings, in order to avoid the 
complications discussed in the previous sub-section.  
90  Thomas Pogge, “An Egalitarian Law of the Peoples”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 23, 
no. 3, 1994, pp. 195-224.  
91
  Ibidem, p. 196.  
92
  Ibidem, p. 199. 
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But Rawls himself is actually opposed to the idea that distributive 
justice is global in scope. He claims that “the principles of justice for the basic 
structure of society are not suitable as fully general principles. They do not 
apply to all subjects […] or to the law of the peoples”93. In nuce, the argument 
is synthesized by Abizadeh as follows: (1) the primary subject of justice is 
society’s basic structure, (2) a basic structure global in scope does not exist. 
From (1) and (2) we obtain: (3) the scope of justice is not global94. Rawls 
maintains that there are duties which we owe to international agents, such as the 
duty to respect the freedom and independence of other peoples, the duty of non-
intervention, the duty to observe treaties, the duty to honor human rights etc95, 
but these duties are weaker than those required for the construction of a theory 
of distributive justice.  
The debate on the problem of the national/global scope of distributive 
justice is on-going, and, unlike most of the discussions present in the other 
sections of this paper, there appears to be no convergence to a consensual 
position at the moment. Both positions carry ideological implications. If 
distributive justice is national in scope, cosmopolitanism is clearly rejected. If 
distributive justice is global in scope, then economically protectionist policies96, 
opposition to foreign aid and anti-immigrationist policies97 cannot be ethically 
                                                          
93
  John Rawls, “The Law of the Peoples”, Critical Inquiry, vol. 20, no. 1, 1993, p. 39. Rawls 
is therefore consistent with his theory of justice as fairness by adhering to a political 
conception of justice at an international level as well. This view is defined in relation to 
the possibility of owing international duties by Nagel: “Every state has the boundaries and 
population it has for all sorts of accidental and historical reasons; but given that it 
exercises sovereign power over its citizens and in their name, those citizens have a duty of 
justice toward one another through the legal, social, and economic institutions that 
sovereign power makes possible. This duty is sui generis, and is not owed to everyone in 
the world, nor is it an indirect consequence of any other duty that may be owed to 
everyone in the world, such as a duty of humanity. Justice is something we owe through 
our shared institutions only to those with whom we stand in a strong political relation. It 
is, in the standard terminology, an associative obligation” (Thomas Nagel, “The Problem 
of Global Justice”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 33, no. 2, 2005, p. 121).  
94  Arash Abizadeh, “Cooperation, Pervasive Impact...cit”, p. 322. Abizadeh himself 
considers that this view is mistaken and that proponents of this position wrongly equate 
the scope of justice with the site of justice (Ibidem, pp. 323-324).  
95
  John Rawls, “The Law...cit”, p. 46.  
96
  See Radu Dudău, “Globalizarea şi globalismul”, in Mihaela Miroiu (ed.), Ideologii 
politice…cit., p. 250).  
97
  Although on many occassions at the level of political theory dichotomies on various 
issues are acceptable (and I think this is the case with nationally/globally owed duties) at 
the level of policy formulation, most times, dichotomous distinctions cannot be fruitfuly 
used and must be replaced with positions on a continuum. The immigration problem is a 
relevant example. At one side we can place strict prohibitions on immigration, which 
might approach (but perhaps not perfectly overlap) the immigration policy of North 
Korea. At the other side we would have a position where individuals can immigrate 
without any sort of constraints imposed, even some very non-invasive procedure such as 
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justified. Ideologies promoting the latter sorts of policies, such as monist 
ideologies and conservatism98 are therefore incompatible with distributive 
justice, in the cosmopolitan view, since they are, at most, based on a political 
conception of justice. It might be claimed that by rejecting foreign aid, 
libertarianism should also be excluded as having a purely national scope, but I 
think that this view is mistaken since in this case the rejection is not based on a 
political conception of justice, but on a different specification of what sorts of 
duties are owed to individuals.  
 
 
ON THE PROXIMAL IDEOLOGICAL AFFILIATION 
OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
 
 In this section I move from the purpose undertaken in sections 2-6, 
which was to show incompatibilities between various core principles of 
ideologies and specifications of the constitutive elements of distributive justice, 
and attempt to sketch a thin outline of the relation between social-democracy 
and distributive justice, showing that the latter is required by the former.  
The basic ideological content of social democracy99 can be said to have 
sprung mainly from two different strands of thought, i.e. socialism and 
liberalism, but at present social-democracy is not reducible to either of them. 
Further, like all ideologies, social democracy has known a significant amount of 
alterations throughout its history100. Some of these alterations, like the Third Way 
version of social democracy supported by Tony Blair, Gerhard Schroder or Jose 
Socrates were so highly significant in shaping modern day social democracy, 
that a recourse to prior versions becomes less relevant in the scholarly debate.  
As mentioned in the first section, when discussing social-democracy I 
will primarily refer to the platform of the Party of European Socialists, and, 
                                                                                                                                              
an ID check at the border. Almost all policies which are ideologically prescribed fall 
somewhere between the two extremes and our task is to show with approximation where 
they are situated on this continuum, in relation to the other ideologies and to the 
extremities of the continuum. By claiming that the conservatives support anti-
immigrationist policies I do not therefore mean that they do not allow for any sort of 
immigration, just as I do not mean that more lenient policies, such as the social 
democratic ones, do not impose any sorts of constraints on potential immigrants.  
98
  See http://www.gop.com/2012-republican-platform_Reforming/#Item11, 17.02.2014 for 
American conservatism and Principle 7 of the Prague Declaration for European 
conservatism.  
99
  Throughout this paper I consider that left-wing liberalism (in the tradition of the 
Democratic Party in the U.S.) and social democracy in the tradition of social democratic 
parties in Europe (grouped in the Party of European Socialists) are equivalent. While 
differences between them may naturally exist, as is the case even within the PES family, 
the ideological core is sufficiently similar to permit this approximation.  
100
  See Alice Iancu, “Social-democrația” in Mihaela Miroiu (ed.), Ideologii politice...cit., 
pp. 70-104.  
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more specifically to their PES Declaration of principles101 adopted on the 24th 
of November 2011102. This procedure has two advantages: (1) the Declaration 
conveys the basic principles of contemporary social democracy thought at the 
European level, (2) the Declaration is supported by a group which contains 
every major social democratic party in Europe, so it is as close as possible to 
being action-guiding. The most relevant part of the Declaration for the present 
purposes is principle 8. This principle is formulated as follows: 
  
“A strong and just society is one that instills confidence and inspires trust. 
To guarantee this trust and confidence, we must ensure that the wealth generated by 
all is shared fairly. This collective responsibility embodies our conviction that we are 
stronger when we work together. It also reflects our determination to enable all 
people to live a dignified life, free of poverty. All members of society are entitled to 
protection from social risks in life”103. 
  
The second sentence of the principle is particularly significant, since it 
clearly makes the case for distributive justice, with wealth as the unit of 
distribution104 105. The underlying idea of the formulation of that sentence seems 
to be very similar to that of Rawls in relation to the understanding of society as 
“a cooperative venture for mutual advantage”106. The problem raised both in the 
Rawlsian conception and the social democratic principle is therefore how to 
arrange inequalities generated by the surplus of wealth created through the 
cooperation of individuals in a society and, in both cases, the response is that it 
should be distributed fairly107. Of course, it is not clear if the conception of 
fairness in the Declaration is further decomposed into a maximal scheme of 
basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity and difference principle as in Rawls’ 
theory108 or if fairness is understood as “requiring that individuals get what they 
are due”109 or something altogether different, but regardless of its particular 
interpretation, fairness can be considered to represent a patterned principle of 
                                                          
101  Henceforth Declaration.  
102
  http://www.pes.eu/sites/www.pes.org/files/declaration_of_principles_web_en_0.pdf, 
accessed on 29.12.2013.  
103
  http://www.pes.eu/sites/www.pes.org/files/declaration_of_principles_web_en_0.pdf, 
accessed on 29.12.2013. 
104
  This can in turn be compatible with the resourcist interpretation, the primary goods 
interpretation, the welfare interpretation or the capabilities interpretation of the currency 
of social justice, depending on the actual policies designed to implement this principle.  
105
  A potential candidate for the currency of distributive justice, i.e. well-being, also appears 
in principle 5 of the Declaration.  
106  John Rawls, A Theory...cit, p. 4.  
107
  The idea of fairness is also deeply embedded in the 2012 Democratic Party Platform, 
where the term “fair” appears approximately 30 times in various contexts, most often 
related to the idea of citizens paying their fair shares in society, fair markets and 
competitions and fairness in the distribution of opportunities.  
108
  Ibidem, p. 53.  
109  Peter Vallentyne, “Distributive...cit”, p. 548.  
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distributive justice. The last two sentences of principle 8 also point to 
distributive justice. The enabling of all people to live a dignified life which 
avoids poverty and a requirement that all people have access to decent work 
(Principle 4) constitute other core ideas of distributive justice, which seem to be 
most compatible with the sufficientarian view110. Also, the claim that all 
members are entitled to protection from social risks seems to be undergirded by 
the same intuition which we can find in Rawls111 and Dworkin112, i.e. that the 
effects of bad luck in the assignment of socio-economic positions are morally 
arbitrary and must be neutralized. Thus, it also calls for the same type of 
redistribution from those who benefited from the effects of this type of luck to 
those who were negatively affected. 
Principles 9 and 10 of the Declaration, which call for gender equality 
and equal access to rights, education, culture and public services for all, 
regardless of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, sexual 
orientation, gender identity or age are also in line with major egalitarian justice 
theories such as those of Rawls, Dworkin, Cohen or Arneson which all call for 
fair equality of opportunity113. Principles 7 and 12, which call for solidarity 
between generations and international solidarity are also embedded in certain 
conceptions of distributive justice, which call for a broad distribution of 
advantages, as shown in section 6.  
Thus, if we agree that the idea of a society where individuals have valid 
moral claims to a fair-share of the resources produced and distributed is 
fundamental for social-democracy, as the PES Declaration of principles seems 
to suggest, then we might consider the concept of distributive justice as being 
not only compatible, but in fact constitutive for social democracy. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In this paper I have sought to broadly discuss the compatibility between 
contemporary political ideologies and various perspectives concerning 
distributive justice. Following my analysis, I conclude that social democracy (or 
left-wing liberalism, associated with the Democratic Party in the US) is the 
ideology which reflects considerations of distributive justice most faithfully, 
being compatible with all the elements of a distributive justice theory and even 
explicitly requiring them as part of its ideological core.  
 I also show that other ideologies, such as feminism, environmentalism 
and cosmopolitanism are fully compatible with some, but not all, interpretations 
                                                          
110  See Harry Frankfurt, “Equality...cit”, pp. 33-34.  
111  John Rawls, A Theory...cit. 
112  Ronald Dworkin, “What is Equality?...cit”.  
113
  See John Christman, Social and Political Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction, 
Routledge, London, 2002, p. 80 for a distinction between equality of opportunity and 
equality of outcome.  
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of distributive justice and further, they require principles of distributive justice 
in the cases where they are fully compatible. Further, I show that right-
libertarianism is rejected by the pattern element, and on most interpretations it 
is incompatible with some definitions of the scope of distributive justice, such 
as definitivism and empirical possibilism and the sentient beings view. The 
same is true for anarchism. I also show that conservatism is rejected by the 
pattern element, by the currency element114, by empirical possibilism, by the 
sentient beings view and by some implications of cosmopolitanism. Further, I 
claim that monist ideologies are rejected by the currency element, the 
responsibility condition and the cosmopolitanism view and by all of the 
reasonable interpretations of the rational agents/sentient beings debate.  
While Christian-democracy and European liberalism are not necessarily 
found to be incompatible following the analysis of each particular element, they 
do not take into account any principle of distributive justice in their ideological 
platforms and do not demand such a principle. Therefore, the conclusion that 
social democracy is the only comprehensive ideology which reflects fully 
developed considerations of distributive justice seems warranted. Still, it is 
necessary to mention both that: (1) Christian-democracy and European 
liberalism could theoretically incorporate some principles of distributive justice 
(extending beyond the basic distribution of rights and duties), but do not appear 
to do so in their mainstream contemporary interpretations and (2) some 
ideologies, which are narrower in scope, i.e. feminism, environmentalism and 
cosmopolitanism are also compatible with certain interpretations of distributive 
justice and require the incorporation of such considerations into their 
ideological core, so I do consider that distributive justice is not ideologically 
monopolized by social democracy.  
As a final note, I underline once again the fact that the conclusions of 
this paper should be treated with caution, since they follow an analysis which 
aims to be as comprehensive as possible in the inclusion of ideologies and 
elements of distributive justice, on pain of a more in-depth exploration of only 
one of these elements on various ideologies, or alternatively, on the relation 
between one ideology and the various operationalizations of distributive justice 
elements. These tasks will unfortunately have to be postponed for other works. 
However, the results obtained from the sort of broad theoretical inquiry 
employed here can be used as stepping stones for further contributions in the 
directions outlined above and are at the same time valuable since they provide a 
full (albeit imperfect) picture of the range of issues which can be discussed 
when trying to link ideologies to distributive justice principles.  
 
                                                          
114
  In the Republican version. 
